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Abstract  
Globally, the metals and mining sector is a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions. Climate 
change also poses significant challenges for the industry in a number of ways, including risks to 
infrastructure and equipment, transport routes and the cost of energy supplies. The sector is of particular 
importance to Russia, and yet very little is known about how the sector positions itself in relation to this 
important issue. This paper conducts an in-depth look at the response of the Russian metals and mining 
sector to climate change. It looks at the key actors, their willingness to engage with the issue of climate 
change, preferred policy options, and the strategies adopted to further their interests. The role of 
companies, prominent individuals and business associations is considered. The evidence suggests that 
while there is widespread acceptance of climate change as a phenomenon, there is significant variation 
within the sector, with some companies proactive on climate policy, and others more reluctant. Different 
responses are attributed to reputational factors and the disproportionate influence of international and 
domestic policy developments on companies. Russian coal companies, directly threatened by any 
international attempts to reduce coal consumption, display the strongest opposition to efforts aimed at 
curbing emissions. The Russian government, far from thinking of transitioning to a low carbon future, 
is vigorously trying to expand the coal industry. 
Key Policy Insights  
 Understanding how Russia’s domestic position on climate policy is formed is fundamental for 
understanding the factors driving its international engagement on climate policy. 
 The Russian government has no plans to phase out coal, and is instead actively seeking to 
expand the coal industry. This highlights the obstacles to Russia’s commitment to climate 
policy at both the domestic and international levels. 
 The socio-economic consequences of climate policy for the Russian coal industry are a key 
consideration for the government, with some regions heavily dependent on the industry for 
employment and electricity generation. 
Keywords 
Russia; climate change; metals and mining industry; coal; environment; state-business relations.   
Russian Industry Responses to Climate Change: the Case of the Metals and 
Mining Sector 
 
Introduction 
Russia is one of the top five largest contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions (GHG), 
and a major exporter of fossil fuels. The country has very high CO2 emissions per unit of GDP 
and an inefficient energy sector. Its participation in international efforts to address climate 
change is vital and yet Russia has been a reluctant player in international negotiations. After 
some delay, Russia ratified the 1997 Kyoto Protocol but failed to sign up for the second 
commitment period. More recently, the government has stated that it intends to ratify the Paris 
Agreement, although, at the time of writing, a final decision on the matter had not yet been 
reached (Ministerstvo Prirodnykh Resursov, 2017). Russian policy on climate change is weak. 
Russia’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) is to reduce emissions by 25-
30% below 1990 levels by 2030. However, economic decline in the 1990s following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union led to a significant reduction in GHG emissions, making this a 
fairly easy target to achieve. The Climate Action Tracker has rated Russia’s response as 
‘critically insufficient’, noting that the government’s INDC ‘not only lies significantly above 
the emissions levels projected under current policies but also is one of the weakest put forward 
by any government’ (Climate Action Tracker, 2017). 
Domestic policy is set out in a number of documents, including the 2009 Climate Doctrine 
which establishes the main priorities and objectives for climate policy in Russia (Prezident 
Rossii, 2009). For the most part, the primary focus of Russia’s climate policy has been on 
energy saving and efficiency measures and the modernisation of industry, as outlined in the 
Energy Strategy of Russia to 2030, and Presidential Decree 889 ‘On some measures to improve 
the energy and environmental efficiency of the Russian economy’ for example. Further to this, 
the government is due to submit legislative amendments to the Duma (the Russian Parliament) 
which obliges companies to report their GHG emissions (Davydova, 2017). 
How has industry responded to these developments? Have they sought to lobby the government 
to keep Russia’s climate policy weak? Have they ignored the issue of climate change 
altogether? Or have they pushed for a clearer and more certain policy on climate, even at the 
expense of additional environmental regulations? The aim of this paper is to answer these 
questions by exploring industry actors and their interests.  Focusing specifically on the Russian 
metals and mining industry, the paper aims to gain an understanding of how industry actors in 
this sector perceive the issue of climate change, their willingness to engage in policy debates, 
the policy options they are advocating and the strategies they adopt in order to further their 
agenda. A key objective is also to understand how perspectives vary within the metals and 
mining industry.   
The literature on Russia and climate change is extremely limited in comparison to other large 
emitters such as the US, China and the EU. A small but growing number of studies have 
evaluated the development of Russia’s climate policy, including the interplay between 
domestic politics and Russia’s behaviour at the international level (Andonova & Alexieva, 
2012; Henry & Sundstrom 2007; Henry & Sundstrom 2012), the influence of international 
climate politics on Russia’s domestic position (Andonova, 2008), the framing of climate policy 
(Tynkkynen, 2010), media coverage (Poberezhskaya, 2016), and the role of scientific experts 
in policymaking (Wilson Rowe, 2013). A number of works have pointed to the role of industrial 
interests in shaping climate policy in Russia, including creating a support base for ratification 
of the Kyoto Protocol (Andonova, 2008), and business interest in Joint Implementation projects 
(Korppoo, 2007). However, few works have considered the behaviour and attitudes of specific 
industries within Russia to climate change and their ability to shape domestic policy.  
Beyond Russia, considerable attention has been paid to the role of business actors in climate 
politics, although most works are concerned with Western liberal democracies. Research has 
explored the variety of strategies employed by business in response to climate policy, including 
voluntary commitments and forms of private regulation (Bulkeley & Newell, 2015); individual 
firm-level emissions targets, and membership in associations which advocate joint action 
(Jones & Levy, 2007); and how corporate actors seek to influence policy, by advocating 
market-based solutions (Kolk & Pinkse, 2007), or building the momentum for carbon trading 
(Meckling, 2011). 
In examining the role of business as a potential collaborative partner for government in policy 
formation, Kim and Darnall (2016) develop a typology of business responses to mandatory 
regulation, using climate change as a policy example. For them, there are four types of response 
(proactive, anticipatory, defensive and reactive) that vary depending on political position of 
companies and social responsiveness. Firms that are politically active (proactive or defensive) 
engage in lobbying, while inactive firms (anticipatory or reactive) are disengaged from the 
political discussion. Firms will also be either supportive (proactive or anticipatory) or 
unsupportive (defensive or reactive) toward a political concern: such as climate regulation 
(Kim & Darnall, 2016, 329-30). This article adopts this typology in order to evaluate the 
different perspectives adopted by Russian metals and mining companies. While Kim and 
Darnall use their typology to identify where opportunities for government-firm collaboration 
might lie, it also provides a useful frame for identifying obstacles to policymaking and the 
challenges associated with trying to incorporate non-state actors into the process.    
Literature on specific industries is more limited. Research has explored how the global oil 
industry has responded to the politics of climate change including divergent policy trajectories 
found within the industry (Pulver, 2007), and the different strategies of major multinationals 
(Levy & Kolk, 2002; van den Hove, Le Menestrel & de Bettignies, 2002; Skjærseth & Skodvin, 
2001). More recently, Downie (2017) has explored US coal and utility actors, highlighting that 
while there was strong opposition from coal companies to regulatory measures to limit 
emissions, the utility industry was more divided. This study therefore seeks to build on this 
literature in two ways: by broadening the scope of the literature to include Russia, a non-
Western and non-democratic country, and by contributing a case study on the relatively 
understudied metals and mining sector. 
In order to examine the responses of industry actors to climate policy, a sample was taken of 
the largest companies in the metals and mining sector. Analysis of a range of documents was 
used, including corporate environmental and social responsibility reports (CESR), which are 
widely used in the literature examining business responses to the environment (Allen & Craig, 
2016, p.8). While there are of course limitations in using information based on self-reporting 
from companies (if for example there is no independent verification of the actions taken), they 
represent an important communication tool for corporate actors to indicate their commitment 
to CESR to both internal and external stakeholders (Allen & Craig, 2016), and point to the 
steps taken to incorporate climate issues into decision-making. CESR reports are supplemented 
by industry and business association reports, government documents including meeting 
transcripts, and media reports.  
The article is structured as follows: first, an overview of metals and mining in Russia is given. 
Second, an examination of key industry actors and their interests is presented. Third, a case 
study of the coal industry is presented, focusing on Russia’s largest coal company, Siberian 
Coal Energy Company (SUEK), and its oligarch owner, Andrei Mel’nichenko. In some ways 
SUEK is exceptional, given its level of participation in policy debates and the prominence of 
Mel’nichenko. However, the focus on SUEK provides a valuable insight into the arguments 
put forward by the coal industry against climate policy, in both economic and social terms, as 
will be discussed. Furthermore, the company represents a significant share of Russia’s coal 
industry. SUEK is significantly larger than its nearest competitor, producing 105.4 million 
tonnes (Mt) of coal in 2016 (SUEK, n.d.-b) in comparison with Kuzbassrazrezugol’ which 
produced 44.3 Mt (Kuzbassrazrezugol’, n.d.). SUEK’s contribution represented nearly one-
third (27%) of Russia’s total production (385.7 Mt) for the year (Ministerstvo Energetiki, n.d.-
a). Its size and prominence make it worth investigating in some detail. Finally, consideration 
is given to prospects for collective action on climate policy within the metals and mining 
industry.  
Metals and Mining in Russia 
Metals and mining is of great importance to the Russian economy. In 2014 for example, the 
industry had total revenues of US$121.6bn (MarketLine Industry Profile 2016, p.7). In 2014, 
iron and steel was the largest sector, worth US$80bn, representing 65.9% of the total value of 
the industry. This was followed by precious metals, worth US$14.5bn (12%), then base metals, 
worth US$11bn (9%). Coal was worth US$9.2bn (7.6%). Finally, aluminium was worth 
US$6.8bn (5.6%)(MarketLine Industry Profile, 2016, p.11).   
Globally, Russia is one of the largest producers of a range of metals, including nickel and 
palladium.1 It is the world’s fifth largest producer of steel, accounting for 4.3% of global 
production in 2014 (BMI Research, 2015, p.9). Russia is the world’s second largest producer 
of aluminium and one of the world’s largest exporters (BMI Research, 2015, p.13). 
                                                          
1 Palladium is a platinum group metal used primarily for making catalytic converters in cars but has a range of 
other uses including jewellery and in the electronics industry. 
The Russian metals and mining sector is highly concentrated, with a number of large, private 
Russian companies, and limited state ownership. There is little foreign ownership.2 Russian 
metals and mining is also heavily dominated by a number of prominent individuals: the so-
called ‘oligarchs’. Two key figures feature in this account: Oleg Deripaska and Mel’nichenko. 
For more detail on the metals oligarchs, see Fortescue (2006; 2013). 
The industry is also a big emitter of greenhouse gases. According to the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), if we look at GHG emissions for the Russian 
Federation by sector3 (without land use, land-use change, and forestry), industrial processes 
(excluding energy use) accounted for 7.89% of the total in 2012. Of this, the metal industry 
(category 2.C4) accounted for 50.69% of the total in 2012; while the mineral industry (category 
2.A5) accounted for 27.30% (UNFCCC, 2015). Significant amounts of fuel and energy are also 
used during mining and metallurgy; the figures for which are reported in category 1.A.2.a (iron 
and steel).6 For example, 46237.22kt of CO2 are reported for 2015 in the 2017 Russian 
Inventory Report (Russian Federation, 2017b). In addition, coal mining releases significant 
amounts of methane (reported in category 1.B.1.a). In 2015 for example, total methane 
emissions were 2.5 million tons (Russian Federation, 2017a, p.71).  
The mining and metals sector is also likely to be heavily affected by climate change. A range 
of potential challenges for the industry exist, including risks to infrastructure and equipment, 
transport routes, and the cost of energy supplies (Arent et al, 2014, 676; Schuchard, & Nelson, 
2011; ICMM, 2013). Within Russia, the impact of climate change on industry includes the 
increased risk of forest fires and floods, more intense and widespread droughts, risks to human 
health, and damage to infrastructure including railways, road and pipelines from permafrost 
degradation (Roshydromet, 2014). There are also a range of regulatory risks including 
government regulations on GHG reporting and energy efficiency targets, noted above. 
Actors and their interests in the metals and mining industry  
This section explores the strategies adopted by some of Russia’s largest metals and mining 
companies to respond to climate change and policy developments in the area, turning first to 
individual companies followed by an assessment of the prospects for collective action on 
climate from industry actors 
Companies  
                                                          
2 Russia’s Strategic Sectors Law (Federal Law No. 57-FZ, 29 April 2008) places limits on foreign access to 
areas of the economy designated as ‘strategic’. The law requires approval by the government of foreign 
investment in activities that hold strategic importance (article 6), including the geological study, exploration and 
extraction of minerals in subsoil blocks of ‘federal significance’ (point 39). This includes diamonds, nickel, 
platinum metals and uranium.  
3 UNFCCC reporting guidelines require Annex I Parties to the Convention (including the Russian Federation) to 
provide an annual GHG emission inventory broken down by sector.  
4 This includes the production of iron and steel, ferroalloys, aluminium, magnesium, lead and zinc.  
5 This includes the production of cement, lime and glass.  
6 Russia does not provide separate statistics for category 1.A.2.b (non-ferrous metals) and f (non-metallic 
minerals). 
At the most basic level and in line with the Russian government’s approach, a number of large 
companies have concentrated primarily on reducing energy consumption and introducing ways 
to address energy efficiency. Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works (MMK), a steel producer, for 
example, monitors energy consumption and has a programme to address energy efficiency 
(MMK, 2015). Beyond this, however, MMK has little engagement on climate change. 
Similarly, Novolipetsk (NLMK), another steel producer, focuses on energy efficiency and has 
a specific company energy policy aimed at rationalising use of resources and introducing new 
technology (NLMK, 2015, p.40).  
Some companies report that they have started monitoring and reporting on GHG emissions. 
Evraz, for example, is a large steel and mining company, and the largest coking coal producer 
in Russia (Evraz, n.d.; Evraz, 2015, p.9). The company reports its emissions annually, and 
devotes attention and resources towards energy saving measures (Evraz, 2015, p.93). In 
addition to reporting on their GHG emissions, a number of companies have internal climate 
policies. Polymetal International, for example, a leading producer of gold and silver, monitors 
and reports on GHG emissions, has a dedicated policy for managing its carbon emissions, and 
an energy efficiency programme (Polymetal, 2015, p.32; Polymetal, n.d.). Similarly, Severstal, 
one of the world’s largest steel producers, has an environmental policy which includes climate 
related goals, such as the reduction of GHGs and optimising energy use (Severstal, 2011). They 
also have set targets for reducing emissions (Severstal, 2015, 108). These companies are 
broadly anticipatory (Kim & Darnall, 2016) in nature, focusing on internal actions such as 
energy efficiency and GHG monitoring, but not engaging in wider political debates. 
The companies that have the most progressive internal responses to climate change also have 
external strategies and are engaged in policy debates both within Russia and internationally 
with their industry colleagues. Their participation takes a variety of forms, which can be 
considered broadly proactive. There are four key companies of note: Polyus, Metalloinvest, 
Alrosa and Rusal. 
Polyus Gold is Russia’s largest gold producer, holding the world’s second largest gold reserves 
(Polyus, n.d.-b). The group reports its GHG emissions annually, and has an internal policy 
focused on exploring renewable and low-carbon sources of energy (Polyus, n.d.-a). Polyus’s 
most important strategy has been its membership of the International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM), which is an international group of companies whose stated aim is to strengthen 
‘environmental and social performance’ in the mining industry (ICMM, n.d.). Polyus is the 
only Russian member of ICMM, which it joined in 2015, having met a number of social and 
environmental performance measures.7 In October 2015, all ICMM members (including 
Polyus) adopted an official statement on climate change, with the organisation lobbying for a 
global agreement on climate change, a price on carbon, and market mechanisms to reduce GHG 
emissions (Polyus, n.d.-a).   
                                                          
7 According to ICCM, ‘Polyus Gold was recommended for membership by an independent expert review panel 
in a process that closely scrutinizes the adherence of the applicant company to responsible social and 
environmental performance in mining and metals operations’ (ICCM, 2015).  
Metalloinvest, an iron ore and steel company, identifies environmental issues such as reducing 
GHG emissions as a priority. It reports its GHG emissions, and has concentrated on equipment 
modernisation and improving technology, together with energy efficiency programmes 
(Metalloinvest, 2015). As part of the company’s external strategy, Metalloinvest is also a 
member of the World Steel Association (WSA), the primary industry association representing 
steel producers. It participates in the WSA’s Climate Action programme, which collects data 
on CO2 emissions from its members, which is then intended as a resource to help guide 
individual company policy. It should be emphasised however that the WSA does not make this 
data publicly available (WSA, n.d.).  
Alrosa, a group of state owned diamond mining companies, is another of the proactive 
companies. Alrosa does not have a stand-alone climate strategy, but does address the issue in 
its CESR reporting. It monitors GHG emissions, has guidelines for reducing emissions, and a 
programme aimed at energy efficient technologies and energy conservation. Alrosa has an 
official position on climate change, stating that it is a ‘global problem, the solving of which 
should involve all industrial enterprises that have an impact on the atmosphere along with both 
global and state participation’ (Alrosa, 2015, p.78). Alrosa has also joined the Climate 
Partnership of Russia (CPR), a voluntary business initiative aimed at coordinating climate 
change mitigation efforts, discussed below. 
The leader amongst Russian metals and mining companies on climate is Rusal, which is one 
of the world’s largest aluminium producers. Its operations cover the whole spectrum from 
bauxite mining to aluminium production (BMI Research, 2014, p.59). Internally, the company 
has a range of climate related actions. For example, in 2007 the company initiated the Strategy 
for a Safe Future, which aimed at reducing its impact on the climate (Rusal, 2015, p.64). Like 
Alrosa, Rusal initiated a GHG accounting system in advance of legislation (Rusal, 2015, p.66), 
and in 2014, the company claimed to have reduced emissions ‘by 50% up to the level of 1990’ 
(p.5). The company also has five strategic goals, including reducing its carbon footprint, 
improving energy efficiency, and introducing ‘green’ technologies (Rusal, 2015, pp.64-5). 
Most notably however, Rusal has been engaged in external activities. In 2008, Rusal joined the 
UN Global Compact ‘Caring for Climate: Business Leaders Platform for Action’, an initiative 
which facilitates business commitments on climate. Rusal is one of only two Russian 
companies to join.8 The company was instrumental in setting up the CPR, discussed below.  
No doubt one of the driving forces behind Rusal’s environmental image is the president of the 
company, oligarch Deripaska. Deripaska has significant interests in the metals and mining 
sector, and owns a 48.13% share in Rusal through his En+ group. Rusal also owns 27.82% of 
Norilsk Nickel, the world’s largest nickel and palladium producer (Forbes.ru, n.d.). Deripaska 
is also a frequent spokesperson on environmental issues, having displayed a complex and at 
times contradictory attitude towards the environment in the past. For example, despite being 
associated with notoriously polluting enterprises such as Norilsk Nickel, Deripaska is also chair 
of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP) Environment Committee. In 
this role, he has participated in a number of important debates in recent years, including the 
                                                          
8 The other is the Svirin Family, a furniture retail business. 
introduction of the ‘best available technology’ principle into Russian legislation, which 
requires companies to modernise their industrial production processes in order to achieve the 
best possible environmental outcomes.9 Deripaska was broadly supportive of the aims of the 
policy, although he lobbied hard for industry concessions throughout the process (see Martus 
2017a).  
On climate policy, Deripaska has been active both within Russia and internationally. According 
to his own website, Deripaska, ‘is one of the staunchest advocates for [the] introduction of a 
global carbon tax’, and supports the creation of an international carbon fund using revenues 
from the tax to invest in ‘innovative renewable projects’ (Deripaska, n.d.). At the same time 
however, it is important to note that Deripaska has significant interests in coal through his En+ 
Group. Deripaska has emphasised that he would not move out of coal, and has argued that there 
is a need to find alternative ways to use coal rather than shift away from use altogether (Clark 
& Sanderson, 2015). While this is far from unexpected, it does temper somewhat his image as 
a metals oligarch turned international climate crusader.10  
The case of the coal industry 
As an industry, coal represents something of a special case within the broader metals and 
mining sector, because its very existence is directly threatened by climate change mitigation 
policies that necessarily imply a shift away from coal. After considering the importance of the 
industry for the Russian government, this section focuses on the response of SUEK and its 
owner, Mel’nichenko to climate policy debates, including the socio-economic framing of the 
debate by the coal industry. 
Globally, Russia is a major coal producer. It has the world’s second largest reserves of 
recoverable coal (BMI Research, 2017, p.9), and in 2014 was the third largest exporter (WCA, 
n.d.). The coal industry is very important for the Russian economy. In 2014 for example, the 
coal sector was worth US$9.2bn (MarketLine Industry Profile, 2016, p.11). According to the 
Ministry of Energy, in 2016, 385.7 Mt of coal were produced (Ministerstvo Energetiki, n.d.-a), 
and approximately 15% of Russia’s electricity generation came from coal (BMI Research, 
2017, p.16). Furthermore, a great deal of coal mining takes place in single-industry towns or in 
areas heavily dependent on the industry, and as a result, there are important socio-economic 
concerns for the government.  
The importance attached to the coal industry by the government is most clearly demonstrated 
by the significant state investment in the sector, with 35 billion roubles (approximately 
US$0.6bn) allocated to the restructuring of the coal industry from 2016 to 2020 (Ministerstvo 
Energetiki, n.d.-b). Coal is also an important element of Russia’s Far East development policy, 
                                                          
9 For more detail on the policy, see Martus, 2017b, pp.133-5. 
10 It is also worth noting that a key motivation for Deripaska and Rusal is trying to ensure the competitiveness of 
Russian aluminium in the face of Chinese exports. Rusal has pointed out on numerous occasions that 90 % of 
electricity used in its smelting plants comes from hydroelectricity, whereas China’s smelters are powered by 
coal (see for example, Mukhamedshin, 2017). 
and connected with the expansion of railways and port development in the region (see 
Fortescue, 2016).  
There are a number of key strategic policy documents aimed at stimulating the industry. The 
most important of these is contained within the State Programme (gosprogramma) on Energy 
Efficiency and Energy Development; with the sub-programme ‘Restructuring and 
Development of the Coal Industry’ devoted specifically to the industry. The programme was 
approved by Medvedev on 7 December 2015, with the Ministry of Energy responsible for its 
implementation.11 The sub-programme sets out the main priorities for the government, 
including the modernisation of existing enterprises, the creation of new production centres, the 
development of the domestic market, and the strengthening of Russia’s position in the global 
market. Importantly, the sub-programme aims to raise production capacity to 440 million 
tonnes per year (Portal Gosprogramm RF, n.d.-b). There is no indication of any plans to reduce 
output, let alone move away from coal production and use altogether.  
The coal industry’s position on climate change 
One of the central figures in Russian coal is Mel’nichenko, who is the majority shareholder of 
the SUEK and the Siberian Generating Company (SGK). Mel’nichenko is also one of Russia’s 
wealthiest oligarchs and chair of the RSPP Commission on the Mining Complex. 
SUEK is Russia’s largest coal producer and one of the largest coal producers globally. In 2016 
it was ranked as Russia’s 25th largest private company. Mel’nichenko owns 91.2%, and the 
company’s general director Vladimir Rashevskii owns 7.8% (Forbes.ru, 2016). The company’s 
coal assets are located in Siberia and the Far East, with the biggest operations in Kemerovo 
(SUEK, n.d.-b). 
SUEK has a company position on climate change, which notes that not only has Russia 
committed to reduce its GHG emissions to 70-75% of 1990 levels, but that ‘indeed, Russia has 
already fulfilled its obligations’ (SUEK, n.d.-a). SUEK’s statement notes that ‘we recognise 
that the production of coal and coal-fired generation are associated with GHG emissions, and 
we are deeply aware of our responsibilities to help preserve the Earth’s environment for current 
and future generations. As a major coal producer, we also recognise our responsibility to 
continue providing the energy people need’ (SUEK, n.d.-a). The company’s agenda to address 
climate change includes a focus on research and investment in technology to improve 
production efficiency and decrease emissions, including methane in particular. The company 
reports its GHG emissions annually (SUEK, n.d.-a). 
For his part, Mel’nichenko has spoken about the relationship between the coal industry and 
climate policy on a number of occasions, talking up the role of coal in the world’s future energy 
supplies. In relation to the Paris Agreement, Mel’nichenko is quoted as saying in June 2017 
that ‘Russia has already done a great job in realising the goals set by the Paris Agreement’, as 
a result of the large share of hydro and nuclear energy, together with the implementation of 
                                                          
11 State Programmes are important strategic documents which outline a set of activities, objectives and details on 
implementation in a specific priority area for the government and individual ministries (see Portal 
Gosprogramm RF, n.d.-a). 
energy efficiency measures (RIA Novosti, 2017). His views, as we might expect, largely 
correspond with both SUEK’s corporate statement of climate change and the position 
advocated by the RSPP Commission on the Mining Complex. 
Mel’nichenko’s position provides an interesting contrast to that of Deripaska, discussed earlier. 
Mel’nichenko makes no reference to introducing a price on carbon, which would affect his coal 
assets considerably. He is not overly critical of global efforts to address climate change, but 
nor is Mel’nichenko pushing for Russia to do more as Deripaska has done. In fact, he argues 
that Russia is performing well. According to Mel’nichenko, Russia is one of the global leaders 
in reducing GHG emissions and an ‘environmental donor’, adding that, ‘I think, we will not 
need to undertake global efforts in this direction’ (RIA Novosti, 2017). The idea of Russia as 
an environmental donor is common, particularly in relation to climate change, which describes 
Russia’s vast forest resources and the significant reduction in GHG emissions that occurred as 
a result of economic decline in the 1990s as Russia’s contribution to solving the world’s 
environmental problems. It forms part of what Tynkkynen has described as the ‘mission frame’ 
(2010, 189).  
In an interview conducted in 2015, Mel’nichenko said he was not concerned about a potential 
shift away from coal for environmental or other reasons because of growing energy 
consumption around the globe. While agreeing that ‘it is pointless to deny the existence of the 
greenhouse effect’, Mel’nichenko argued that, in his view, renewable energy sources such as 
biomass, wind and solar were ‘not promising and they will not help us in the fight against 
climate change’ (Newslab.ru, 2015). Supporting ‘economically unpromising technologies 
through budget subsidies or regulatory restrictions on the use of traditional fuel sources, 
including nuclear energy’ represents ‘an unjustified diversion of resources from solving real 
problems’ (Newslab.ru, 2015).  
A meeting of the Commission for Strategic Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector and 
Environmental Security held in August 2013, provides a further insight into the priorities of 
Russia’s coal companies. The meeting was held in Kemerovo, a city in the Kuzbass region, 
and focused specifically on the coal industry. Both government and key industry 
representatives were in attendance. The meeting was hosted by Russian President Putin, who 
began by commenting on the failure of the domestic coal market to develop. He then proceeded 
to outline the various options available to encourage development, such as the construction of 
new coal-fired power plants in the Far East and Kaliningrad. Putin’s focus was on stimulating 
the domestic consumption of coal, and increasing exports despite falling prices (Prezident 
Rossii, 2013). Putin mentioned the need for additional incentives to help the coal industry with 
the cost of modernising production, creating new production and processing facilities, and 
lowering transport costs (railway tariffs in particular), which are a key concern for the industry. 
When given the opportunity to speak, the coal industry representatives, as we might expect, 
requested greater state support.  
The evidence from Mel’nichenko’s comments and the Kemerovo meeting makes the priorities 
of coal companies clear. For Mel’nichenko, coal is a solid and reliable source of fuel for Russia. 
In Kemerovo, industry sought support from the government in the form of tax concessions and 
policies to stimulate the industry. For the most part, these requests aligned with the 
government’s position, and there seem to be no major disagreements between the two parties. 
Finding common policy ground with the government likely increased the chances of 
influencing the policy agenda, and perhaps the best measure of this can be seen through the 
introduction of the coal-specific programmes discussed above, introduced in the years 
following the Kemerovo meeting. From the available evidence, there is a strong sense that 
climate change and climate policy are not perceived as threats to the main interests of the coal 
industry.  
Socio-economic framing of the debate 
In addition to focusing on economic issues and requests for state support, the coal industry has 
been quite effective at framing its opposition to climate policies in socio-economic terms. A 
very good example of this can be seen in relation to the campaign ‘Right 4 Coal’ (Pravo na 
Ugol’), which has focused on the consequences of shifting away from coal for the inhabitants 
of Siberia, which is heavily dependent on the coal industry for employment and electricity 
generation. 
The ‘Right 4 Coal’ campaign was started in response to proposals to introduce a carbon tax 
and create a ‘carbon free zone’ (‘bezuglerodnaya zona’) in eastern Siberia. This idea was raised 
in February 2016 by Yuri Trutnev, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and 
Presidential Plenipotentiary Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District, and repeated by the 
Ministry for Natural Resources. According to reports, it was opposed by the Ministry for 
Energy and the RSPP (e.g. RIA Novosti, 2016; Davydova, 2016).  
The ‘Right 4 Coal’ campaign was initiated by workers from SGK, which owns coal-fired power 
plants in Siberia. It has the appearance of a popular, grassroots campaign, but it was run by 
SGK employees, and may also have been financed by the company (SGK, 2016). Support for 
the coal industry and coal fired electricity generation is framed in terms of supporting miners 
and their families, who would lose their jobs if the ‘carbon free zone’ was implemented. For 
example, the website states ‘we are those who care whether there will be heat in the homes of 
the inhabitants of Siberia and how much they will have to pay for the opportunity to use 
electricity and heat’ (Pravo na ugol’, n.d.). Further, in a music video titled ‘the right to coal - 
the right to life’ (Pravo na ugol’ – pravo na zhizn’) created by students in Kemerovo and posted 
on the campaign’s website, the phrase ‘ugol’ – khleb’ is repeated: literally, ‘coal is our bread’ 
(Pravo na ugol’, n.d.). 
The campaign’s website states that ‘today energy and industry are under threat, under the guise 
of fighting for the environment, politicians and some oligarchs are proposing to impose a tax 
on CO2 emissions, without much thought for the consequences this will entail’ (Pravo na ugol’, 
n.d.). We can only assume they are referring to Deripaska as one of the oligarchs, and a 
supporter of a tax on carbon as noted above. Environmental arguments against coal are rejected 
with statements such as: ‘the relationship between CO2 emissions and its impact on climate has 
not been proven by scientists’ (Pravo na ugol’, n.d.).  
At the time, the campaign received a fair amount of attention within Russia, primarily from 
sympathetic local media outlets, such as ‘Vesti Kuzbass’ (Vesti Kuzbass, 2016a&b). The 
‘Right 4 Coal’ campaign is no longer active since the ‘carbon free’ eastern Siberia proposal 
appears to have been dropped by its supporters within the government. However, the campaign 
and the opposition generated by the ‘carbon free’ eastern Siberia proposal highlight the 
considerable challenges associated with taking on the coal industry in Russia, and it is not a 
challenge that Putin or the Russian government appears to have any appetite for.  
Collective action on climate?  
For the most part, the metals and mining industry’s approach to climate change has been 
characterised by companies acting independently of one another, rather than lobbying 
collectively as an industry at the domestic level, as has been seen in other cases of 
environmental policymaking in Russia (Martus, 2017b). An important potential source of 
collective action comes from the RSPP; a powerful lobby group representing the interests of 
Russia’s largest companies. However, the picture is complicated by the fact that the RSPP’s 
position on climate change has been far from consistent, and characterised by internal 
disagreements over the direction to take. The organisation had previously supported ratification 
of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (Henry & Sundstrom, 2007, 54) and criticised the government’s 
decision not to sign up for the Protocol’s second commitment period (Andonova & Alexieva, 
2012, 619). The president of the RSPP, Aleksandr Shokhin, has stated that the RSPP would 
support business participation in combating climate change (RIA Novosti, 2008). More 
recently however, the organisation has been more obstructive, arguing that the Paris Agreement 
creates significant risks for the Russian economy as it would accelerate the decline in industrial 
production (Davydova & Kryuchkova, 2016), and seeking to delay the introduction of 
legislation which obliges companies to report their GHG emissions (Davydova, 2017).  
Some of the strongest opposition in relation to climate policy from within the RSPP has come 
from the RSPP Commission on the Mining Complex (chaired by Mel’nichenko, as noted 
above). At a meeting in April 2016 to debate the prospects and risks of introducing carbon 
regulation, for example, it was noted that implementing the Paris Agreement and regulating 
GHG emissions would have ‘a very significant influence on the pace of socio-economic 
development in the Russian Federation’, creating risks for the ‘competitiveness of the majority 
of the basic industries of the Russian economy’ (RSPP, 2016). It was noted that ‘decisions 
taken within the framework of the Paris Conference … reflect not so much problems of an 
environmental character, as the politico-economic interests of the various parties’ (RSPP, 
2016). Furthermore, Russia’s existing ‘over-fulfilment’ of its obligations under the Kyoto 
Protocol to reduce GHG emissions mean that additional financial burdens should not be placed 
on industry (RSPP, 2016).12 Given Russia has not formally decided whether to ratify the Paris 
Agreement, and the legislation on GHG emissions has not yet been submitted to the Duma, it 
remains to be seen whether the RSPP Commission will get its way. However the extent of the 
                                                          
12 The Kyoto Protocol committed Russia to not exceed its 1990s level of GHG emissions. As noted above, 
economic decline in the 1990s meant that this required little effort to achieve.  
organisation’s opposition to some of the policy options currently under discussion is fairly 
clear. 
While collective lobbying on climate policy from the metals and mining industry at present is 
limited to the RSPP, the Climate Partnership of Russia (CPR) may provide a potential avenue 
in the future. The CPR was established just before the Paris Climate Conference (COP 21) in 
November 2015, and aims to ‘consolidate the efforts of Russian business to mitigate 
environmental impacts and help prevent climate change’ (CPR, n.d.).13 It supports Russia’s 
ratification of the Paris Agreement (CPR, 2017). It was also involved in lobbying efforts at 
COP 23 for example, and has participated in high-level meetings with the Ministry for 
Economic Development. Rusal, which was instrumental in setting up the partnership as noted 
above, and Alrosa, are the only metals and mining companies to join so far.14 
Discussion and conclusions  
The findings from this research point to divisions within the metals and mining sector, notably 
between coal and non-coal dedicated companies. Coal giant SUEK argued strongly for the 
interests of the coal sector, and against further Russian commitments to international climate 
efforts. Returning to Kim & Darnall’s (2016) typology, SUEK displayed characteristics of a 
defensive firm: politically active in its opposition to the increased regulation climate policy 
commitments would bring. The RSPP Commission on the Mining Complex supported these 
efforts. We might expect that other coal companies would also display similar behaviour, or 
fall into the reactive category; unsupportive of efforts to curb GHG emissions, but politically 
inactive in policy debates. Further research is required. 
Moving away from coal, the majority of companies surveyed demonstrated behaviour that was 
broadly anticipatory in nature: there was wide-ranging acceptance of climate change as an 
issue, but no strong will to be actively involved in policy debates. On a very basic level, the 
metals and mining sector has been most willing to implement energy efficiency measures, 
which as noted, has been a core focus of the government's approach to climate change 
mitigation efforts. In this way, industry and government efforts are aligned. It makes economic 
sense for industry to implement efficiency measures, and there have been government 
incentives to encourage this.  
In addition to energy efficiency, there was little to suggest serious opposition from individual 
companies to the government's policy obliging companies to publish their GHG emission 
figures, with legislation due to be introduced to the Duma, and a number of companies 
including SUEK, Polyus Gold and Rusal already reporting on emissions. However, it is worth 
noting that the RSPP did raise objections, and has sought to delay legislation on the issue.  
Finally, there are a number of companies that have been proactive on climate: they agree that 
climate change represents a significant concern and are working to try and influence the policy 
                                                          
13 According to Anatolii Chubais, CEO of nanotechnology company Rosnano, Russian business support for the 
climate talks was originally to have been sent through the RSPP but an ambiguous reaction from the 
organisation prompted the launch of the CPR initiative instead (see Davydova, 2015). 
14 Other members include Rosnano, hydroelectricity company Rushydro, and several of Russia’s largest banks 
including Sberbank, Alfa Bank and VTB 
debate. As discussed, several companies have tried to lobby the government to introduce more 
far-reaching GHG mitigation regulations and encourage greater Russian participation in 
international climate policy, as demonstrated by Deripaska and Rusal. Several companies have 
also participated in international discussions with their sectoral colleagues, joining a range of 
different international partnerships such as the ICMM, the WSA Climate Action programme, 
or the UN Global Compact, though the success of such partnerships remains to be seen. 
The reasons why we see these different responses from companies across the metals and mining 
industry are complex, but two explanations emerge. The first is reputational. In a different 
context, Downie (2017, 34) suggests that, in contrast to US based coal producers, Rio Tinto 
with its UK headquarters ‘operated in a different institutional environment, one generally more 
supportive of action on climate change’  . In Russia, a number of the companies most involved 
in efforts to reduce their emissions and support policy efforts operate overseas, have foreign 
minority shareholders or foreign stock exchange listings. Polyus Gold for example is 
headquartered in London, and Rusal has operations in a number of countries, including an 
aluminium smelter in Sweden, and alumina refineries in Ireland and Italy. Companies that 
operate in countries with more advanced climate policies are more likely to be concerned with 
their image and make attempts to generate positive ‘environmental PR’. 
Second, individual companies are likely to be disproportionately affected by international and 
national policy developments. Some companies, like state-owned diamond producer Alrosa, 
are not likely to be heavily impacted by climate change mitigation efforts at all. The larger, 
diversified companies such as Norilsk Nickel and Rusal are able to adapt to changing 
circumstances more easily, by moving into other metals and shifting out of mining and 
producing coal for example, and so we might expect them to support efforts to reduce emissions 
more readily. Dedicated coal companies like SUEK, however, are directly threatened by 
international attempts to reduce coal consumption or move away from it altogether. This is 
most likely why Deripaska, whose companies produce a range of metals, has called for a global 
carbon tax, and Mel’nichenko, whose wealth depends heavily on coal production, has not. 
The final issue to consider is what relevance these different views within the metals and mining 
sector have for government policy. The literature beyond Russia might suggest we draw a more 
optimistic conclusion. Kim and Darnall (2016) for example argue that proactive businesses are 
potentially valuable collaborative partners for government; specifically during policy 
formation. Similarly, Downie’s (2017) study of energy industries in the US, suggests that 
divisions within an industry can potentially be exploited by policymakers within the 
government. Along these lines it might be argued that if pro-climate policymakers could be 
found within the government (such as the Ministry for Natural Resources for example which 
supported the idea of a carbon free zone in Eastern Siberia), there is a potential opportunity to 
engage with companies and groups like the CPR in order to further their agenda. 
However, the Russian coal industry represents a formidable obstacle to the formation of an 
active state policy on climate; and perhaps most importantly, government and industry interests 
are closely aligned on this issue. Far from thinking of transitioning to a low carbon future, the 
Russian government, and the Ministry of Energy in particular, is vigorously trying to expand 
the coal industry, as indicated in the State Programme for example. Politically, it would also 
be very difficult for Putin to close down coal mines in areas heavily dependent on the industry 
like the Kuzbass. So, while the battle between the more pro-climate interests within the metals 
and mining sector, and those opposed to action such as the coal companies, will no doubt 
continue for many years to come, the odds are certainly stacked in favour of the latter. 
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